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Abstract 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) designed, developed and flew the 
alternative Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as risk mitigation for the 
baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort system (LAS) already in 
development. The NESC was tasked with both formulating a conceptual 
objective system (OS) design of this alternative MLAS as well as 
demonstrating this concept with a simulated pad abort flight test. The 
goal was to obtain sufficient flight test data to assess performance, 
validate models/tools, and to reduce the design and development risks 
for a MLAS OS. Less than 2 years after Project start the MLAS simulated 
pad abort flight test was successfully conducted from Wallops Island on 
July 8, 2009. The entire flight test duration was 88 seconds during which 
time multiple staging events were performed and nine separate critically 
timed parachute deployments occurred as scheduled. Overall, the as-
flown flight performance was as predicted prior to launch. This paper 
provides an overview of the guidance navigation and control (GN&C) 
technical approaches employed on this rapid prototyping activity. This 
paper describes the methodology used to design the MLAS flight test 
vehicle (FTV). Lessons that were learned during this rapid prototyping 
project are also summarized. 
1.0 Introduction and Background 
In June 2007, the Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
(ESMD) requested the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) undertake the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Project. The MLAS 
was named after Maxime (Max) Faget. Dr. Faget was the lead designer of the Mercury space 
capsule and developed its abort system called the “Aerial Capsule Emergency Separation 
Device”. It was in his honor that the MLAS was named. His innovative spirit and his team’s 
rapid development of new technologies formed the inspiration for the MLAS Project.  
The charter for the MLAS Project was to develop, design, and test an alternate concept for the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Launch Abort System (LAS). MLAS would be 
theoretically capable of extracting the Orion vehicle from the Launch Vehicle (LV) at any time 
from crew ingress at the launch pad through staging and ignition of the second, or upper, stage of 
the Ares I crew LV. The MLAS Project would conclude with at least one full-scale unmanned 
pad abort test suitable for demonstrating the viability of this alternate LAS concept. The MLAS 
Project would be run independently from the Constellation Program (CxP) and Orion Project in 
order to minimize impact on in-line program resources. It was dictated that off-the-shelf 
hardware and existing technology would be used on MLAS wherever possible. Design and 
development work previously accomplished by the NESC would be leveraged for this project. 
Previous work includes the CEV Smart Buyer Design, Composite Crew Module, and the 
Alternate Launch Abort System.  
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The NESC cultivates a problem-solving and technical assessment organizational model that 
permits it to rapidly assemble inter-center, interdisciplinary engineering teams. This is typically 
done by exploiting the pre-established Technical Discipline Teams (TDT) built and maintained 
by each of the fifteen NASA Technical Fellows. The TDTs are the networking mechanism used 
by NESC to gain access to technical knowledge, expertise and contacts at all the NASA Field 
Centers. This NESC infrastructure was used to form the NASA-wide MLAS Project team. For 
example, members of the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) TDT (see Reference 1) 
were recruited to serve on the MLAS GN&C team and other members were subsequently 
recruited to serve as peer reviewers of the GN&C team’s work.  
Teams were formed based primarily on engineering disciplines and the subsystems of the flight 
test vehicle (FTV). Several of the NASA Technical Fellows served as leaders of these sub-teams. 
The teams were purposefully kept small to allow for closer technical interaction, technical 
agility, and faster design and development decision making. In addition, the existing internal 
quick response business processes of the NESC were leveraged to rapidly implement new 
engineering support contracts and hardware procurements with industry and to also help 
establish the programmatic partnerships with the management, engineering, fabrication, 
integration, and range support elements at NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). 
The MLAS GN&C team was formed in July 2007 and was given the responsibility for modeling, 
simulating and analyzing the trajectory and attitude dynamics of the MLAS FTV during its 
simulated pad abort flight. The GN&C team members ensured that the flight test occurred within 
the envelope defined by the requirements, and they constructed the nominal target flight timeline 
and trajectory. All of the MLAS trajectory and attitude flight instrumentation equipment, 
including the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, 
were selected by the GN&C team. These navigation sensors were chosen to generate flight test 
data that would permit post-flight reconstruction of MLAS vehicle trajectory and attitude 
dynamics. Analyses performed by the GN&C team determined ballasting, motor alignment, and 
launch stand angle requirements. Over the course of the MLAS Project the GN&C team worked 
closely with System Engineering and Integration, Aerodynamics, Landing and Recovery System 
(L&RS), Propulsion, Avionics, Software, Structures, and Loads & Dynamics teams and also 
with the MLAS Chief Engineer. 
MLAS team members and the facilities used were distributed across the country. To offset this, 
team cohesion was maintained by creating a virtual team environment. This meant frequent 
teleconferences using virtual meeting technology supplemented by periodic Co-Locations. These 
Co-Locations were week-long gatherings of the entire MLAS team which were held roughly 
once per month during the early and middle phases of the MLAS Project. Component and scale-
model testing, loads analysis, and most of the design was performed at sites across the country, 
with results integrated with the team during the Co-Locations. The Co-Locations were organized 
working sessions, not formal meetings or design reviews and were proven to be useful to 
facilitate rapid decision-making, ensure common understanding between team members, and to 
generally build teamwork. Focused MLAS Configuration Control Board meetings were an 
essential forum for the entire team to review critical system design trades, analysis results, 
hardware and software problems, vehicle assembly and operational steps and to then formulate 
project decisions as a group for rapid responsive action.  
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2.0 Baseline Orion Launch Abort System Design 
A brief overview of the baseline Orion LAS is given here to provide some background context 
for the MLAS design and concept of operations. As part of the overall CxP architecture the 
Orion CEV will have a LAS to remove the crew to safety (i.e., away from the LV) in the event of 
an emergency either on the pad or during ascent. Orion’s current tower-based LAS evolved from 
the Launch Escape System (LES) used for the Mercury and Apollo Programs (the Gemini 
Program employed aircraft-style ejection seats for abort functions). The Orion Project-designed 
LAS will use tractor nozzle rocket motors to pull the crew module (CM) from the top of the Ares 
I LV and move it to a safe distance where it will parachute to Earth. The design contains a tower 
motor assembly attached to the forward (top) of an ogive fairing that encases the CM of the 
Orion vehicle (see Figure 1). The Orion LAS tower has three motors:  the abort motor, the 
attitude control motor (ACM), and the jettison motor. The reverse-flow abort motor propels the 
LAS away from the LV upon initiation of an abort. The ACM, through eight modulated nozzles, 
provides launch abort vehicle (LAV) stability and re-orients the LAV for the different phases of 
flight. After reaching a safe altitude and distance from the LV, the LAS will release the CM. The 
CM drops from the fairing assembly and the landing parachutes are deployed. Simultaneously, 
the jettison motor will carry the LAS away from the CM.  
The development of the LAS ACM system hardware and uncertainty in the controllability of the 
LAV in the transonic abort regime were major challenges facing the Orion team and were drivers 
for the ESMD leadership to initiate and complete the MLAS Project.  
 
Figure 1.  Orion LAS. 
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3.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Objectives 
At the start of the MLAS Project, the following four primary objectives were identified for the 
pad abort flight test: 
1. Demonstrate that the side-mounted abort concept is feasible for all abort conditions and 
for a nominal launch.  
2. Evaluate the capability of the MLAS to lift the CM from the launch pad to an altitude 
high enough and with enough distance downrange to permit the CM to execute a nominal 
landing. 
3. Demonstrate proper MLAS pad abort initiation and event sequencing. This includes 
flying a stable trajectory, LAS and fairing separation, and re-orienting and stabilizing the 
CM to a recovery condition. 
4. Obtain flight test data that will be used to:  determine the structural loads and the integrity 
of the LAS, fairings and CM during the pad abort; characterize the aerodynamic 
environments experienced by the FTV during the abort, fairing separation, and re-
orientation; and characterize the separation dynamics between the LV interface, the LAS, 
fairings and CM. 
One additional MLAS Project objective was to use the experience gained with MLAS to develop 
a NASA capability for a ‘skunk works’ like rapid prototype design, fabrication, and testing. This 
was an opportunity to expose many NASA engineers to a rapid prototype development project. 
This also prevented the diversion of CxP resources away from their own development activities. 
Intense technical interactions and brainstorming sessions between the engineers on the MLAS 
team, with their diverse backgrounds, experience levels, and disciplines, were very common in 
this dynamic working environment. The significant design innovations, process improvements, 
and clever problem solutions that emerged from these interactions greatly benefited the project. 
4.0 MLAS Design Concept 
Beginning in August 2007, the GN&C team supported the initial design of the MLAS pad abort 
FTV. The origins of the tower-less MLAS FTV can be traced to the initial notional ‘back of the 
napkin’ drawing (see Figure 2) that was conceived during a CEV Smart Buyer Design study 
outbrief brainstorming session in March 2006.  
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Figure 2.  MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. 
Subsequently a refined MLAS drawing (see Figure 3) was provided to NESC in June 2007 by 
Scott “Doc” Horowitz, the Associate Administrator for the ESMD at the time MLAS was 
initiated, as a notional point of departure for the early system level trades and vehicle 
configuration studies.  
 
Figure 3.  Refined MLAS ‘back of the napkin’ drawing. 
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In parallel with their initial design work on the FTV, the GN&C team also supported the 
development of MLAS objective system (OS) concepts and addressed the need for clear 
traceability of the envisioned OS to the pad abort FTV. Fundamentally, the MLAS FTV was 
designed to reduce the risks associated with the passive aerodynamic stabilization approaches 
used on prime OS candidate design concepts.  
Multi-disciplinary system work requiring very tightly coupled technical relationships between 
the GN&C team and the Aerodynamics, Structures, and L&RS teams, as well as the MLAS 
Chief Engineer, were required. It is interesting to compare the final MLAS FTV prelaunch 
physical configuration (see Figure 4) with the original notional drawings depicted in Figure 2 
and Figure 3. One can clearly see that the MLAS abort system concept differs from Orion LAS 
in that it uses side-mounted abort motors instead of a tower-tractor abort motor design that pulls 
the CM from above. The tower abort motor has been designed out of the MLAS concept and the 
CM fully encapsulated in a forward fairing (FF). 
 
Figure 4.  MLAS FTV on launch stool at Wallops Island. 
4.1 Passive Flight Control 
Multiple MLAS system-level flight-control design trades were conducted very early in the 
project. Various mechanisms were considered for maintaining control over the vehicle and 
accomplishing its pitchover turn along the desired launch azimuth. Active guidance with 
concepts using thrust vector control (TVC) and potentially active aerodynamic surface control 
were considered. Since, at the time the MLAS Project was initiated, the highest technical risk for 
the baseline Orion LAS design was the ACM, the team shifted its focus to MLAS design 
concepts that eliminated or mitigated the need for complex flight controls. The GN&C team 
considered and analyzed several passive stabilization schemes for MLAS pad abort boost, coast 
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and re-orientation flight phases. These passive flight control concepts were investigated to 
reduce design and development risk for this compressed-schedule flight demonstration project. 
Ultimately, a passive approach was selected based on its fundamental simplicity and anticipated 
relative ease of implementation. Cost and schedule constraints, along with the observation that 
the TVC method is a flight proven vehicle control technology, were the primary drivers that led 
to the adoption of a purely passive flight control approach. The cost and complexity of 
designing, building and testing an active closed-loop TVC system (including the necessary 
testbeds to integrate and validate TVC hardware & software) for this rapid prototype, short-
duration, initiative did not trade well against the passive flight control scheme. The GN&C 
design and development approach leveraged the WFF Sounding Rocket Program expertise, 
experience, modeling/simulation tools, and flight hardware to the maximum extent possible. 
Independent simulations were performed of the vehicle’s trajectory/attitude dynamics. The 
results of the WFF Portable Object Simulation (PortOSim) flight-control simulation tool were 
favorably compared with the results obtained with the generic simulation flight-control 
simulation tool from Langley Research Center. These comparisons provided early confidence in 
the feasibility of the team’s design concept. Independently generated outputs from another 
GN&C tool, called the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories, were also periodically 
compared with the PortOSim outputs to perform a technical crosscheck on the MLAS flight 
performance in general as well as the boost, coast skirt and CM simulator separation dynamics in 
particular.  
The decision to fly with passive control drove the GN&C modeling, simulation and analyses 
efforts. The GN&C team performed in-depth analyses to fully characterize and understand the 
sensitivity of the FTV flight performance to the relative relationship between the vehicle’s 
center-of-gravity (CG) and the resultant thrust vector (TV) produced by the solid rocket motors 
(SRM) used to propel the FTV. Significant effort was expended to identify and validate the 
specific error sources that made knowledge of the resultant TV orientation uncertain, as well as 
those error sources that introduced uncertainty into the determination of the vehicle’s CG 
location.  
The decision to fly without active closed-loop feedback control also drove the necessity to 
perform several stages of detailed mass properties testing and the associated mandatory need to 
rigorously track, model and manage any mass changes that occurred due to modifications in the 
baseline vehicle design. It was also necessary to develop and implement a simple, physically 
realizable vehicle ballasting strategy to ensure static stability during the boost and coast flight 
phases. 
5.0 MLAS Pad Abort Flight Test Operations 
Figure 5 illustrates the MLAS pad abort flight test concept of operations adopted after extensive 
trade studies and system analysis. From the perspective of the GN&C discipline, the MLAS FTV 
was an unguided, fin-stabilized projectile, using aft-mounted SRMs to carry the primary article 
under test, in this case the FF and the encapsulated CM simulator, to the desired altitude, range, 
and dynamic pressure conditions for reorientation and recovery. 
The SRMs were canted so that their TVs nominally intersected on the centerline at the axial 
station of the CG just after launch. This was done to limit the effect of thrust asymmetries. A 
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spherical bearing interface was used to transfer the thrust loads into the vehicle at the CM heat 
shield. The pivot point of this interface was also placed near the CG to ensure that motor cage 
misalignments would not produce large thrust moments.  
The MLAS FTV was launched from a fixed stool on Launch Pad 1 on NASA’s Wallops Island 
and achieved its turn toward the desired launch azimuth using two mechanisms: 
1. Launch stool tilt angle:  four degrees from vertical along the launch azimuth. 
2. Vehicle radial CG offset:  approximately one inch from the centerline along the launch 
azimuth. 
 
Figure 5.  MLAS pad abort flight test concept of operations. 
Upon burnout of the SRMs, about six seconds after ignition, the boost skirt was separated via the 
frangible joint separation device. Four fixed drag plates presenting a total effective drag area of 
36 square feet were used to ensure positive separation acceleration between the forebody and the 
aft boost skirt. The actual MLAS flight test demonstration began next with the stable coast 
phase. This phase demonstrated the passive stability of the FTV during unpowered flight. The 
powered ascent phase would place the FTV at an altitude of about 7000 feet and roughly 3000 
feet downrange east of the launch site.  
When the vehicle decelerated to a velocity corresponding to a flight dynamic pressure of 100 
pounds per square foot (psf), the coast skirt, including its four fins, was separated using an 
identical frangible joint separation device and drogue parachute. This was followed by an on-
board timer-sequenced reorientation maneuver beginning with deployment of the two drogue 
parachutes mounted to the nose of the FF. The two drogue parachutes attached to the FF served 
to re-orient the FTV to a heat shield-forward attitude in preparation for release of the CM 
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simulator from the FF. A byproduct of the drogue chute deployment was loss of horizontal 
velocity, and thus placing the vehicle on a nearly vertical trajectory. 
During the subsequent descent, at a programmed altitude of 3300 feet, the separation nuts were 
fired and the CM simulator was ‘dropped out’ of the aft-facing FF. This would initiate the 
landing parachute demonstration (LPD). Two drogue parachutes mounted on top of the CM 
forward bay cover (FBC) were deployed via static lines attaching the drogue bags to the FF. At a 
programmed duration of 9.2 seconds after CM release, the FBC was jettisoned, pulling the four 
main parachutes out of their deployment bags that were mounted in the FBC and away from the 
CM. The CM main parachutes possessed a 5-second reef at 26.5 percent of their total inflated 
area prior to fully inflating to increase load sharing through synchronous deployment.  
The entire flight would last approximately 90 seconds from booster ignition until the last element 
of the FTV impacted the ocean. All of the elements landed in the ocean off the coast of the 
launch site. The coast skirt, boost skirt and CM simulator were later recovered. 
4.2 Landing and Recovery System (Decelerator) Events Overview 
The L&RS major events begin with the separation of the coast skirt and end with deployment of 
the CM main parachutes. L&RS operational events are:  
1. Coast Skirt Drogue Deployment – The single drogue deployment was designed to 
achieve a separation distance between the coast skirt and FTV that was adequate to 
deploy the reorientation drogues without entanglement with the coast skirt. 
2. Reorientation Drogue Deployment – Dual drogues were designed to reorient the FTV and 
dampen the FTV motions to the following conditions that were to be provided by the 
Orion LAS for the CEV parachute assembly system (CPAS) during a pad abort: 
a. CM Down-Range Distance at Separation > 3300 ft  
b. CM Separation Altitude > 3300 ft  
c. CM Handoff Lateral Rates < 40 deg/sec  
d. CM Handoff Angle of Attack (AoA) < 40 deg  
e. CM Handoff Dynamic Pressure < 40 psf 
f. CM Handoff Roll Rate < 80 deg/sec 
3. CM Drogue Deployment – As the initial event in the LPD, the CM drogues were deployed to 
decelerate and stabilize the CM in preparation for main parachute deployment. 
4. FBC Release/Main Parachute Extraction – The primary objective of the LPD was to use the FBC 
and CM drogues to extract the four main parachutes in an attempt to achieve a high degree of 
load sharing through synchronous deployment. 
5. CM Main Parachute Full Deployment – This was the final event that decelerated the CM 
to a steady-state descent rate prior to splash down. The only project requirement was to 
achieve steady-state descent prior to splashdown since CPAS main parachutes were not 
available for the test.  
Reference 2 provides an overview of the ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS FTV 
for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after 
separation from the fairing. 
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6.0 MLAS FTV Elements 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the MLAS FTV is comprised of four major physical elements:  the FF, 
CM simulator, coast skirt, and boost skirt. The elements were attached by frangible joints and 
bolts; allowing separation at appropriate intervals during the flight test. The elements were 
integrated into the FTV at the WFF, and were then moved by truck and barge to the Wallops 
Island launch site. WFF was chosen to fabricate and launch the MLAS FTV because it had the 
required assembly, test and launch facilities and a decades-long history of sounding rocket 
testing. On an historical note:  the LES for the Mercury Program was also tested at WFF in the 
late 1950s.  
The distinctive shape of the FTV came from the Sears-Haack body shape chosen by the 
Aerodynamics team for the fairing and the short, but wide, dimensions of the boost and coast 
skirts. The height of the integrated FTV was approximately 400 inches tall from the tip of the 
nose to the lowest point of the boost skirt fins. The diameter of the shell of the coast skirt and the 
boost skirt was approximately 216 inches. The launch weight of the FTV was approximately 
48,000 lb. A description of the major individual MLAS vehicle elements is given below.  
Boost Skirt:  The boost skirt was the aftmost element of the FTV and contained the motor cage 
that held the SRMs in place. The individual motors were installed in the motor cage within the 
boost skirt, and each one was canted inward. A frangible joint was used to attach the boost skirt 
to the coast skirt. Four fixed drag plates were mounted near the bottom of the boost skirt, in such 
a way that they would extend into the free stream, to ensure a rapid separation of the boost skirt 
from the rest of the FTV. Four fins were mounted on the boost skirt to help provide passive 
stabilization during the short (six-second) powered flight phase.  
Coast Skirt:  The coast skirt was attached to the bottom of the FF to provide passive 
aerodynamic stability. The coast skirt had four fins that provided passive stabilization during the 
coast phase of the test flight, which lasted approximately nine seconds. The four coast skirt fins 
were identical to the four fins mounted on the boost skirt. A single aft-facing drogue mortar was 
mounted on the inside wall of the coast skirt to deploy a drogue parachute from the coast skirt 
The coast skirt was mated to the FF with a frangible joint.  
Forward Fairing:  The FF encapsulated the CM simulator, and the combined package was 
called the forward assembly. The shape of the FF was based on a Sears-Haack body to minimize 
drag. The FF contained 1423 lbm of lead ballast in the nose to place the X-axis CG as far 
forward as possible and to provide a minimum of 10-percent body diameters of static stability 
margin during the powered and coast phases of flight. Additional lead ballasting in the motor 
trough1 provided a small Z-axis CG offset to provide an initial pitch-over moment. The FF 
housed the two mortar-deployed drogue parachutes that were used to reorient the forward 
assembly from the vehicle attitude during the coast phase to a heat shield-forward attitude in 
preparation for separation of the CM simulator and the execution of the LPD. 
                                                 
1 Vertical protuberances were placed on the outer mold line of the FF to simulate side-mounted motors. Underneath 
these structures were large channels in the fairing – motor troughs – that provided space for ballast as well as 
avionics, cameras, etc. 
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Figure 6.  MLAS FTV flight configuration (left) and expanded view (right). 
CM Simulator:  The MLAS CM simulator approximated the shape and mass of the Orion CM. 
The CM was attached to the FF using four frangible bolts/nuts. The CM simulator carried 
antennae, avionics wiring and connectors, two IMUs, a data processor, data recorders, and 
cameras. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the GNC frame and the MLAS vehicle frame 
used by the structural engineering team. The GNC frame will be used to represent most of the 
data that will be presented in this paper.  
 
Figure 7.  Definition of GN&C Coordinate Frame. 
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7.0 Driving Technical Issues for MLAS Design and Development 
Both the GN&C and the L&RS teams were constrained, or at least strongly influenced, by the 
following top-level project requirements, needs and MLAS vehicle attributes: 
 No active closed-loop flight control elements – passive aerodynamic stability with 
modest static margins. 
 Multiple propulsive, aerodynamic, mechanical, electrical and sensor performance, and 
operational dispersions (uncertainties). 
 Abort SRMs that provided a fixed and finite propulsive capability with thrust dispersions, 
which exceeded current industry capabilities. 
 The need to passively affect a vehicle pitchover maneuver shortly after abort motor 
ignition to establish a downrange component of velocity early in flight.  
 The need to maximize the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components to 
minimize development costs and schedule – in particular, there was the need to identify 
rapidly available, low cost, flight-proven GN&C instrumentation to permit accurate post-
flight trajectory and attitude reconstruction.  
 Use of components with flight pedigree in equivalent operating environments to reduce 
performance risk and development testing. 
 Availability of required equivalent parachute drag area in flight-proven COTS packages;  
 Parachute material availability – Some Kevlar™ materials had excessive lead times 
compared to nylon (nylon was used when possible). 
 Achieving satisfactory relative separation distances between vehicle elements, identifying 
ways of ensuring positive separation between the elements of the test article that were 
shed during various phases of flight proved to be one of the most challenging parts of the 
design effort.  
 System verification with accurate predictions of FTV trajectories, both nominal and 
dispersed these trajectories and associated metrics established and verified basic MLAS 
flight performance in general and were the main driving basis from which many other 
detailed parachute system design requirements were derived. New trajectory predictions 
were needed soon after each major model change or update to ensure overall design 
compliance.  
 Minimizing, or at least managing, parachute loads in the face of continuous vehicle mass 
growth over the project duration and no alternative to fundamentally alter the parachute 
design or material. 
 The need to have a redundant capability to precisely sequence the timing of critical flight 
test events. 
The technical issues associated with these project requirements, constraints and influences are 
described below. 
7.1 Critical Event Command Initiation Methods 
Early in the MLAS systems design phase it was initially thought that the timing and sequenced 
commanding of critical flight test events could all be established prior to flight and implemented 
with the standard pre-set on-board avionics timers typically used on sounding rockets. On-time 
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activation of the coast skirt separation/reorient-sequence initiation command and the CM 
separation command were of particular importance.  
Subsequently, several months into the project, the Monte Carlo flight performance simulations 
showed large enough dispersions in the MLAS trajectory such that the simple pre-set avionics-
event timer-event command concept had to be abandoned and alternative techniques developed 
and tested.  
After careful consideration of all feasible alternatives, the MLAS Project team implemented two 
independent methods of activating the coast skirt separation/reorient-sequence initiation 
command and the CM separation command. A flight-termination receiver was activated using 
the WFF Range system infrastructure and an on-board flight processor with event-triggering 
decision logic, which were both incorporated into the MLAS FTV design. The logic flow for 
initiating the reorientation initiation (ROI) and CM release (separation) command functions is 
shown in Figure 8. 
In the WFF Range Control Center, the command logic was implemented manually using visual 
cues from a single fixed-scale graphical display of total Earth-relative velocity and altitude (see 
Figure 9). The ROI was commanded by the ground operator when the vehicle crossed the 
constant dynamic pressure constraint line on ascent. CM release was commanded by the ground 
operator as the vehicle descended through a 3300-foot constraint line.  
 
Figure 8.  Reorientation initiation (ROI) and CM release decision logic flow. 
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Figure 9.  Nominal trajectory traces and event constraint lines for WFF Range Control Center 
manual operator decision guidance. 
7.2 Initial Turning Maneuver During Early Boost 
It was determined early in the concept formulation that producing a thrust moment by offsetting 
the vehicle CG from the centerline was the most effective means of producing the initial vehicle-
turning maneuver, also referred to as the pitchover maneuver. This permitted the establishment 
of a downrange component of velocity early in flight. Flowing from this design decision were 
stringent requirements on CG management, along with requirements on aerodynamic stabilizing 
moments to prevent the vehicle from nosing over too far. The vehicle turn could have been 
accomplished entirely by a radial CG offset. However, a tilt offset of the vehicle launch stool by 
four degrees toward the launch azimuth was deemed prudent by both the GN&C team and WFF 
Range safety personnel.  
7.3 Aerodynamic Stability 
Conventional aerodynamic fins were used on the MLAS FTV, rather than the grid fins2 
envisioned for the MLAS OS vehicle, in order to reduce project and schedule risks. The coast 
fins and boost fins were iteratively sized during concept formulation to accomplish the following 
objectives: 
1. Provide sufficient aerodynamic stability during boost to ensure that the resulting 
trajectory dispersion was small enough for the vehicle to meet its test condition insertion 
                                                 
2 Grid fins, also known as lattice fins, are often used as a lifting and control surfaces for highly maneuverable 
aerodynamic vehicles. Deployable grid fins have been used on the Russian Soyuz TM-22 spacecraft to provide 
aerodynamic stabilization during an abort either on the pad or during atmospheric flight. The main advantages of a 
grid fin are its low hinge-moment requirement and good high AoA performance characteristics. 
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goals. It was desired that the aerodynamic pitching frequency of the vehicle would be 
representative of the closed-loop bandwidth frequency of a guided objective system 
under the action of a TV control system.  
2. Provide sufficient aerodynamic stability during the coast phase of flight to accommodate 
and dampen the angular impulse delivered by the asymmetric thrust of unmatched motors 
during tail-off.  
Early analysis demonstrated that a ‘rule of thumb’ static margin of 10-percent body diameter 
would be sufficient to accomplish both goals. For manufacture, it was desired that all eight fins 
be identical, so the fins were sized together to yield a minimum static margin of 21.7 inches for 
both the boost and coast configurations. After exiting the design phase and during the build 
phase, the FTV’s CG location was rigorously managed to maintain this static margin in the boost 
and coast phase configurations. 
7.4 Relative Separation Distances 
Finding ways of ensuring positive separation between the elements of the test article that were 
shed during various phases of flight proved to be one of the most challenging parts of the design 
effort. To this effect, a GN&C-led Tiger Team was established during concept formulation to 
trade a number of mechanisms for accomplishing piece-part separation. 
The boost skirt separation was accomplished using four fixed drag-plates sized initially to 
provide 2 g of relative acceleration between the forward and aft bodies. This approach has been 
used successfully to accomplish drag separation of sounding rocket stages. The performance loss 
associated with having the plates out in the flow during boost was considered an acceptable trade 
for the simplicity of the approach. A rule of thumb criterion of 1 g relative acceleration was 
determined prudent, and the plates were sized with margin in the initial design. This margin was 
steadily eroded during the vehicle build phase by mass ‘creep’ and aerodynamic effects 
discovered in computational fluid dynamics. However, the final pre-launch analysis showed just 
over 1 g of separation acceleration.  
The coast skirt separation was accomplished utilizing a mortared drogue (originally ordered as a 
spare reorient drogue). Initially, a rule-of-thumb requirement levied to maintain 200 feet of 
separation between the coast skirt and forward assembly at the time the reorient drogues are 
mortared out. This was later relaxed to 200 feet of separation at time of reorient drogue 
parachute line-stretch.  
A reorient-then-release baseline of the MLAS test vehicle was established in the earliest days of 
the design effort. One byproduct of this concept was that a large amount of rotational energy 
would be imparted into the forward assembly, which would require significant parachute hang 
time allowances to dissipate. During this time, much of the horizontal velocity of the MLAS was 
also scrubbed off. The significance of this is that there remained no effective means to reliably 
develop significant lateral separation between the FF, the FBC, and the CM during final descent.  
The team was forced to rely upon differential drag accelerations on the various objects and a 
somewhat risky parachute deployment timing sequence was set up to race the CM into the water 
before the FF could overtake it and potentially foul the main parachutes. At the second 
Independent Technical Review milestone, in April 2008, a timing concept was presented by the 
 16 
GN&C team that accomplished the goals of maintaining adequate vertical separation between the 
FF and the CM at CM splash. This separation was quickly erased by mass gains in the FF, which 
occurred during fairing segment fabrication. The vertical separation was regained by lowering 
the CM release by 1000 feet; however, these gains were lost again by additional mass gains in 
the FF that occurred during FTV assembly.  
In the end, no requirement was established to prohibit re-contact between the FF, the FBC, and 
the CM. The only mechanism for developing lateral separation between the three objects was 
differences in the transient response to the wind variations with altitude. It was not expected that 
these would be enough to guarantee separation margin with respect to parachute diameters 
(especially the large diameter main parachutes on the CM). The MLAS Project Management was 
willing to accept this as a risk, as long as the analysis showed that there was sufficient time to 
deploy the main parachutes and achieve descent equilibrium velocity prior to a potential re-
contact event. The final pre-launch analysis verified this and showed the FF overtaking both the 
FBC and the CM prior to splash. The FBC was nominally predicted to maintain a 320-foot 
vertical separation distance from the CM during the flight. The FF was predicted to overtake the 
FBC at an altitude of 820 feet (at ~10 seconds after CM main parachute line stretch). The FF was 
predicted to overtake the CM at an altitude of 165 feet, at 16 seconds after CM main parachute 
line stretch.  
7.5 Parachute Loads Management 
Of all the technical areas on MLAS where the GN&C and L&RS teams interacted, the problem 
of determining, managing and minimizing parachute loads was probably the most dynamic point 
of technical intersection. Addressing the parachutes’ loads issues was an almost constant battle 
on MLAS. This situation arose primarily out of the necessity to procure, very early in the project, 
low-risk readily available parachutes in flight-proven COTS packages. This had the effect of 
setting a bound on parachute load-capability performance very early in the project in return for 
project cost and schedule benefits.  
During each of the three major MLAS analysis cycles of parachute forces, the primary influence 
on parachute loads were: 
 Continuous FTV mass increases during the development life cycle,  
 Improved knowledge of the FTV aerodynamic performance, 
 A fixed and finite amount of propulsive capability, and 
 The results of trajectory optimizations by the GN&C team to increase the probability of 
achieving the stated mission success goals. 
The vehicle mass increases continued well after the last planned parachute force analysis cycle, 
prompting a final but unplanned parachute force analysis cycle. Parachute force is directly 
proportional to the dynamic pressure and drag area. Since the parachutes were selected very 
early in the vehicle design cycle, preserving the safety factors in the parachute elements was of 
continuous concern to both the L&RS and GN&C teams and was carefully monitored as the 
project progressed towards launch.  
The GN&C team initially supported the L&RS team by providing a set of FTV trajectories, 
which were then analyzed to develop a set of performance requirements for the landing system 
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components. The performance requirements were to essentially meet the drag area requirement 
and always maintain a minimum factor of safety of 1.6 over the range of possible trajectories. To 
derive the trajectories the L&RS team, the GN&C team performed special sets of Monte Carlo 
dispersed simulations using the portable object simulation (PortOSim) tool to characterize a wide 
range of possible trajectories and parachute deployment conditions. The state vectors, along with 
the vehicle mass properties and aerodynamics database, provided the data needed to determine 
parachute forces during all deployment. To develop upper and lower bounds for the parachute 
forces, the GN&C team provided three state vectors that encompassed 90 percent of the 
predicted trajectories. These were referred to as the shallow, nominal and steep trajectories. The 
shallow trajectory typically was characterized by a lower apogee altitude, higher dynamic 
pressure and greater downrange distance than the nominal trajectory. The steep trajectory had a 
higher apogee altitude, lower dynamic pressure and smaller downrange distance than the 
nominal trajectory. 
Each state vector (shallow, nominal and steep) was used to drive a simulation of parachute 
deployment forces and thus, was a point estimate for each trajectory and not dispersed. This 
approach was taken for two reasons:  1) The GN&C team trajectories could bound the expected 
flight conditions – including the 99th percentile trajectory, and 2) the critical performance 
parameters of the selected parachutes, primarily the drag coefficient Cd, and opening shock 
factor Ck were well known from flight test. A range of Cd was analyzed for the CM descent on 
the drogues and mains to ensure that the CM could achieve a steady-state rate of descent prior to 
splashdown. 
7.6 GN&C Instrumentation 
GN&C instrumentation was required for accurate post-flight trajectory and attitude 
reconstruction. There was a strong push by project management for the GN&C team to identify 
low-cost COTS sensors for this purpose. The GN&C team identified suitable instrumentation 
less than two months after project initiation. Three IMUs and two GPS receivers were selected as 
the on-board GN&C instrumentation set. The Avionics team then assumed responsibility for 
procuring, physically accommodating, electrically integrating and interface testing the IMU and 
GPS receiver flight hardware as part of their overall Avionics subsystem development effort. The 
requirements for, and performance of, final pre-launch functional verification testing of the 
IMUs and the GPS when the FTV was mounted on the launch stool was the responsibility of the 
GN&C team.  
A total of three Gimbaled LN-200 with Miniature Airborne Computer (GLN-MAC) IMU sensors 
were flown on the MLAS FTV. This specific choice of IMU was made very early in the MLAS 
Program, in August 2007, based on its performance capabilities, relatively low cost, low 
mass/power/volume, extensive sounding rocket flight heritage, and off-the-shelf availability. The 
GLN-MAC IMU is a standard piece of GN&C equipment used on most of the Wallops sounding 
rockets. Therefore, the level of engineering familiarity the MLAS Wallops team members had 
with this type of IMU was also a factor in this unit’s selection. The general operating and 
technical performance characteristics of the GLN-MAC IMU are provided in Reference 3.  
Two IMUs were mounted on the avionics pallet inside the CM simulator. A passive vibration 
isolation system was installed between the avionics pallets and the vehicle structure. This 
redundant pair was mounted inside the CM to provide the vehicle rate, acceleration, and attitude 
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data throughout the flight. The IMU-1 and IMU-2 data was both recorded onboard the FTV and 
sent to the ground via radio frequency (RF) telemetry.  
A third identical IMU was mounted in the FF to provide relative motion dynamics information 
during the CM separation. The IMU-3 data was captured only via RF telemetry to the ground. 
IMU-3 was added to provide a redundant measurement of the FF/CM separation dynamics that 
would complement the imagery of the separation event taken by the high-speed camera system. 
The high-speed camera system was the primary means of obtaining information on the relative 
motions of the FF and the CM during dynamics information during the CM separation.  
The Javad Navigation System (JNS) JNS100 50-channel single-frequency global navigation 
satellite system receiver board, with raw data and position solution output rate up to 100 Hz, was 
selected for use on MLAS by the GN&C team. Similar to the IMU selection, this choice of GPS 
receiver was made very early in the MLAS Program, in July 2007, based on its performance 
capabilities, relatively low cost, low mass/power/volume, and availability. Unlike the GLN-
MAC IMU, at the time of its selection for MLAS the Javad JNS100 GPS receiver was not a 
standard piece of GN&C equipment used on the Wallops sounding rockets. However, there was 
a high level of engineering familiarity with this particular receiver, on the part of the GN&C 
team members, from prior experience on NASA’s Autonomous Flight Safety System Project and 
other efforts. This working familiarity with the JNS100 was also a factor in this unit’s selection. 
It is interesting to note that the JNS100 has since been selected as the Next Generation GPS 
receiver for the Wallops Sounding Rocket Program. The general operating and technical 
performance characteristics of the JNS100 GPS receiver board are provided in Reference 4.  
For flight on the MLAS FTV, this JNS100 receiver board was packaged by WFF engineering 
into a GPS receiver unit. After buildup, the MLAS GPS Receiver units were acceptance tested in 
the Code 598 GPS Development and Test Laboratory at Wallops. In a manner very similar to the 
IMU integration process, the two JNS100 GPS Receivers were each integrated into the Avionics 
pallets inside the CM Simulator. These receivers benefited, as the IMU did, from the passive 
vibration isolation system installed between the Avionics pallets and the vehicle structure.  
During the phases of flight leading up to CM release, these receivers were fed by two patch 
antennae mounted on the outer mode line of the FF. Upon CM release, a lanyard switch was used 
to switch the GPS receivers to two patch antennae mounted on the CM. This redundant GPS data 
was used by the on-board flight computer to trigger the ROI sequence and the CM release events 
in accordance with the logic discussed above.  
7.7 System Verification Methods 
Nearly all requirements allocated to the GN&C team were verified by analysis. The team 
primarily utilized the PortOSim 6-degree of freedom (DOF) simulation tool, which served as the 
Project’s end-to-end predictor of MLAS flight performance. PortOSim is a software application 
that supports engineering modeling and simulation of launch-range systems and subsystems, as 
well as the vehicles that operate on them (Reference 5). It is a flexible, distributed, object-
oriented, and real-time simulation. A scripting language is used to configure an array of 
simulation objects and link them together. The script is contained in a text file, but executed and 
controlled using a graphical user interface. 
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A PortOSim multi-body model of the MLAS FTV system was first developed and validated. 
That model was then used to track the effects of vehicle design changes, and as-built variations 
from the design on the ability of the MLAS to meet many of these requirements. Monte Carlo 
simulations were used to provide the Systems Engineering and Project Management teams with 
figures of merit relating to the a priori estimated rate of satisfaction of the various requirements 
levied upon the test vehicle flight characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the primary requirements 
tracked by the GN&C team, along with the results from the final 1000-run Monte Carlo 
simulation performed shortly before launch; along with the related quantities observed during 
flight using the GPS and IMU sensor complement. 
Table 1. Key GN&C constraints and design goals. 
MLAS Flight Parameter Constraints 
& Design 
Goals 
Monte 
Carlo 
% Rate 
Flight Observation 
CM Deployment Sequence 
Initiation Altitude  
> 3300 ft 98.8 Sequence initiation began with first threshold 
crossing detected on-board at 3407-ft above pad 
reference. (CM released at 3250-ft above pad ref.)  
CM Deployment Range  > 3300 ft 
from shoreline
94.5 4004 ft from shoreline  
CM Lateral Rate at Release  < 40 d/s 95.9 7.3 d/s  
CM AoA at Release  < 40 deg 96.7 1.2 deg  
CM Roll Rate at Release  < 80 d/s 100 4.1 d/s  
Dynamic Pressure at CM 
Release  
< 40 psf 94.3 37.9 psf  
Dynamic Pressure at ROI  < 100 psf 97.0 89.0 psf  
Dynamic Pressure at FF 
Drogue Deployment  
< 100 psf 98.1 37.9 psf  
Max Alpha Total During 
Boost  
< 30 deg 100 14.6 deg 0.4s after first motion  
5.5-deg peak during turn  
Max Alpha Total During 
Coast  
< 30 deg 100 2.4-deg peak coast AoA seen at L+12.8-s  
Dispersion Sensitivity 
Dispersion sensitivity analyses were initially performed early in the project to gain insight into 
which design parameters drove flight performance. It was determined early that the vehicle was 
most sensitive to the System CG Radial Location Uncertainty contributor. Much effort went into 
managing the radial CG knowledge and uncertainty throughout the design, fabrication, and 
integration phases of the MLAS Project.  
Unmodeled Aerodynamic Phenomena  
 20 
Concern was expressed over the potential for unmodeled aerodynamic phenomena to adversely 
affect the vehicle flight characteristics during the boost and coast phases of flight. It was the 
assertion of the GN&C team that the aerodynamic uncertainty model developed and used in our 
dispersion analysis adequately bounded these types of effects. Given these magnitudes of 
perturbations, aerodynamic uncertainty effects presented trajectory deviations approximately one 
order of magnitude lower than those resulting from radial CG perturbations.  
Event Deployment Algorithm Verification 
A battery of 17 distinct test scenarios (see Table 2) was created to stress-test and boundary-test 
the ROI and CM release event triggering algorithms that were to be deployed in flight software 
as well as from a human-operated ground command system. Each scenario was modeled in the 
end-to-end 6-DOF mission simulator. The simulations were played into a GPS RF simulator 
attached to a JNS100 GPS receiver for data capture. The flight software developer used the 
resulting data files to test the flight computer. The simulations were also played into the WFF 
Range Display Network in the Range Control Center to train the Flight Control Console 
operator, and verify that he was prepared to issue command functions for the MLAS flight test.  
Table 2. Test scenarios used to verify flight software  
and ground command operator. 
Id  Description  
1  Nominal Trajectory  
2  Steep Trajectory  
3  Shallow Trajectory  
4  Near 3300-ft Altitude Trajectory  
5  Apogee Occurs at 100-psf Q  
6  Straight-Up Trajectory  
7  Nominal Left-Azimuth Trajectory  
8  Nominal Right-Azimuth Trajectory  
9  270-deg Roll Case  
10  Boost Skirt Fails to Separate  
12  Reorient Drogue Deployment Failure  
13  Apogee below 3300 ft  
14  Back-range Trajectory  
15  Parallel to beach North  
16  Parallel to beach South  
17  1 Motor Fails to Ignite  
8.0 Flight Test Results 
The MLAS FTV was successfully launched on July 8, 2009 at 1026 Zulu. Figure 10 shows the 
MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition:  the top image was captured by a ground based 
WFF range camera and the bottom image was taken from a camera mounted on a helicopter 
hovering offshore from the launch pad. Trajectory and flight dynamics data were gathered using 
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the two on-board JNS100 GPS receivers and three GLN-MAC IMU platforms. Review of video 
and event monitoring data by the Avionics team has shown that all flight events occurred as 
planned.  
The GN&C team used a 6-DOF multi-body end-to-end mission simulation in the WFF Range 
Control Center as a means of developing a pre-flight estimation of the vehicle response to 
measured atmospheric conditions (winds, density, pressure, etc.) for the purpose of assessing 
launch commit constraints. The simulated responses of the vehicle, including the effects of wind 
as obtained from the final (L-3 minute) pre-launch balloon sonde3, represent the baseline 
nominal predictions for comparison with the actual flight performance. Key trajectory 
parameters, derived from flight data and simulation, are summarized in Table 3. The ground 
track is depicted in Figure 11. The launch time was selected to yield light winds. Generally, the 
winds were from the northwest; although, from 1000 feet to the ground, the wind direction veers 
from a north to a northwest direction causing the hook seen in the ground-track (Figure 11) 
toward the end of flight during the CM descent.  
 
An in-depth analysis was performed to ascertain the degree to which the actual as-flown boost 
phase and coast phase vehicle dynamics matched pre-flight predictions. Due to the relative 
sensitivities of the trajectory to various perturbations, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the 
steepness of the as-flown trajectory was caused by a perturbation in the effective moment arm in 
the vehicle pitch plane. The amplitude of the vehicle turn is directly related to the moment arm 
between the TV and the CG. During the boost phase, there will be no difference in the effect of a 
CG perturbation and of a net TV misalignment/offset. There is no reason to expect that such a 
perturbation would be fixed in time; however, there is no realistic means to attempt to estimate a 
time-varying moment arm shift given the available data set. Fixed moment arm reductions, in 
both the MLAS body Y-axis and the MLAS body Z-axis directions were modeled in the post-
flight matching simulation by a static reduction of the radial CG offset. Figure 12 shows the 
vehicle’s transverse attitude response during the boost and coast phases of flight for an iteration 
where the simulated CG was moved toward the centerline axis by 0.23 inches in the MLAS body 
Z-axis direction, and by 0.08 inches in the MLAS body Y-axis direction. 
                                                 
3 The sonde is a device typically used by the WFF Range to make in-situ meteorological measurements of the 
atmosphere which a sounding rocket, or in this case the MLAS FTV, will fly through. Some, called GPS-sondes, are 
equipped with GPS receivers to obtain precise positioning information during data collection and some are simple 
balloons with reflectors that are skin-tracked by range radars during their data collection periods. Data collected 
includes wind, density, static pressure and speed of sound.  
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Figure 10.  MLAS FTV shortly after abort motor ignition:  ground view (top)/ helicopter view 
(bottom). 
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Table 3. Predicted versus as-flown summary trajectory quantities. 
Summary Data Actual 
 
Pre-Flight Predict  
(Using L-3m Sonde) 
Magnitude of  
Miss 
Peak Altitude 7018-ft @10:26:23.0Z 6621-ft @10:26:21.9Z 397-ft 
(0.75-sigma) 
Impact Range/Azimuth 4555-ft / 125.4degT 
@10:27:12.4Z 
5592-ft / 124.2degT  
@10:27:11.6Z 
1042-ft 
(0.73-sigma) 
Peak Velocity 699-ft/sec @10:26:06.2Z 688-ft/sec @10:26:06.0Z 11-ft/sec 
(1.1-sigma) 
Peak Mach Number 0.613 @10:26:06.2Z 0.602 
@10:26:06.0Z 
0.011 
(1.3-sigma) 
Peak Dynamic Pressure 517-psf @10:26:06.2Z 498-psf @10:26:05.98Z 19-psf 
(1.25-sigma) 
Burnout Roll Rate 9.9-deg/sec 
@10:26:07.5Z 
2.7-deg/sec 
@10:26:07.0Z 
7.2-deg/sec 
(1.00-sigma) 
 
 
Figure 11.  MLAS CM ground track. 
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Figure 12.  MLAS vehicle’s transverse attitude response (boost and coast phases). 
A key thing to note from Figure 12 is that there is a close match between flight observation and 
simulation in both the amplitude and frequency of the vehicle attitude response during both the 
boost and coast phases of flight. Thus, in order to match aerodynamic pitching frequencies 
between flight and simulation, the dynamic pressure profile, the aerodynamic forces, the 
aerodynamic force distribution, and the first/second-moments of the mass distribution must all 
match. The unlikely alternative is to have a fortuitous cancellation of errors. In order to match 
the magnitude of oscillation, the initial conditions and disturbance-force environment, caused 
primarily by the radial CG offset, must also match. By observing the first attitude peak after 
launch, it is apparent that the vehicle aerodynamic pitch and yaw damping is higher than that 
computed in the simulation model. This was an expected result. The simulation is fitted with 
models that compute the damping forces and moments from each fin; however, damping effects 
originating from body aerodynamic effects were neglected. Given the close match in lateral 
attitude dynamics, dispersion in the TV-to-CG moment arm was the most plausible scenario 
found for explaining the steepness of the as-flown trajectory when compared to the simulated 
pre-launch trajectory prediction.  
Figures 13 and 14 depict the CM altitude versus range and the CM altitude versus time, 
respectively. Figures 13 and 14 show the position data from the GPS receivers alongside the pre-
flight predictions made with the wind, density, static pressure and speed of sound data from the 
L-3 minute balloon sonde. The as-flown flight trajectory was somewhat steeper than that which 
was predicted in the pre-flight simulation; however, the trajectory deviation from the prediction 
was within 0.75 standard deviations in all directions.  
The actual pad abort test flight was conducted in very close agreement with this operations 
concept. All the key flight test events occurred in the prescribed sequential order and, at within 
acceptable tolerances of, the exact pre-planned time and flight dynamic conditions. 
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Figure 13.  MLAS CM altitude versus range. 
 
 
Figure 14.  CM altitude versus time. 
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9.0 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
The launch of the MLAS FTV occurred at 0626 EDT on July 8, 2009, from a launch stand on 
Pad 1 at the WFF launch site on Wallops Island. This MLAS flight test at Wallops Island marked 
the first successful pad abort test for a human spaceflight vehicle since 1966. Ignition of the 
boosters initiated the powered ascent phase, which ended with booster burnout about six seconds 
later. The powered ascent phase placed the FTV at an altitude of 7018 feet and roughly 3000 feet 
downrange east of the launch site. The flight test demonstration began next with the stable coast 
phase. This phase demonstrated the passive stability of the FTV during unpowered flight. 
Following the coast phase was the re-orientation maneuver using two drogue parachutes to 
change the FTV attitude to heat shield-forward; concomitantly, the horizontal velocity was 
scrubbed resulting in a nearly vertical trajectory. When the FTV dropped below 3300 feet, the 
LPD began. The CM simulator impacted the water at 72.6 seconds after booster ignition. The 
entire test flight lasted a total of approximately 88 seconds from ignition until the last element of 
the FTV impacted the ocean. This flight test was the culmination of a nearly 2-year effort to 
design, build, and fly an alternate launch abort system capable of recovering the crew of NASA’s 
next generation human spacecraft in event of emergency.  
The primary ‘big picture’ lesson learned from the MLAS experience was the great extent to 
which the design and integration of a launch abort system can impact and influence the overall 
Launch Vehicle-Spacecraft system design, overall system reliability, and performance 
capabilities. One must always keep in mind that a LAS is fundamentally part of the LV used to 
place the crew in orbit. In the vast majority of launch operations, where liftoff and ascent are 
nominal, the abort system will not be used and will be jettisoned. Therefore the abort system 
must be designed to not interfere with the safe operations of, or degrade the nominal 
performance of, the LV. Striking the correct balance between LV and abort system requirements 
is a hard optimization problem often necessitating multiple interrelated system-level trade 
studies. Designers must also carefully consider the demanding flight performance requirements 
placed upon an abort system. For example, the LAS must be able to perform flawlessly at any 
point over a wide spectrum of operational regimes. These range from the zero altitude/zero 
velocity state while sitting on the pad prior to launch, then continuing through problematic 
transonic conditions, and finally during exoatmospheric flight until shortly after first stage 
burnout separation. Consider that the abort system also must stabilize and control the orientation 
of the crew’s capsule as it flies not only in the forward direction but in the backward direction as 
well. Satisfying all these competing requirements while minimizing deleterious impacts on the 
LV and avoiding the potential pitfall of introducing over-complexity into the overall system, 
presents a number of unique and demanding abort system engineering challenges for NASA and 
its industry partners.  
Several other important lessons learned came out of this MLAS flight test experience are worth 
highlighting:   
1. The need for all team members to look beyond their immediate discipline task to think, 
speak up, and act like Systems Engineers for the benefit of the project. 
2. The need for planned periodic crosschecks of critical analytical results by having 
technical ‘shoot outs’ between different engineering groups using different tools/methods 
to independently generate analytical products. 
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3. The need for periodic and informal face-to-face peer reviews; the emphasis should be on 
reviewing the details of modeling assumptions, analytic methods, uncertainty 
assumptions, simulation results, control law algorithm designs, software code, etc., and 
not on preparing formal presentations and responding to action items.  
4. The L&RS system design was trajectory driven much more than initially anticipated. 
Therefore, project management should consider the advantages of integrating the 
functions of the GN&C and the L&RS teams into one unified technical team; the nature 
and size of MLAS Project naturally allowed close, almost daily, technical interaction 
between the GN&C and the L&RS teams but on larger, more traditional, projects having 
separate teams could lead to inefficiencies and technical disconnects.  
5. The need for stringent mass properties testing, and vehicle mass properties configuration 
control measures and routine periodic reports, especially on a passively controlled 
vehicle. 
6. The degree of difficulty in safely and reliably performing precision alignment of the solid 
rocket abort motors was initially underestimated.  
7. The need to manage and limit insidious unchecked vehicle mass growth which erodes 
flight performance, degrades system design robustness, increases parachute loads and 
generally diminishes the probability of overall mission success. Associated with this is 
the need to incorporate realistic growth margins into the vehicle’s design to mass budget. 
In addition, this can be mitigated in part by defining a robust set of structural loads 
requirements as early as possible in the project design cycle. 
8. A rapid prototyping activity like MLAS can be accomplished using virtual meeting 
technologies supplemented by periodic Co-Locations of the entire team and by 
leveraging modern online concurrent data sharing and configuration management 
capabilities.  
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